Conflict is
defined as any episode of sustained violence in which national, ethnic,
and religious or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major
changes in status (Bates et. al. 2003 . Huntington defines civilisations as the highest
cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people
have short of what distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined by
both common language, history, religion, customs, institutions and by the subjective
self-identification of people.(Huntington)(19993)
He further states that in the future conflicts
will occur along the cultural fault lines separating civilizations. It is
thought that the increased ease of global communication will lead to more
interactions between people of different cultures, thus intensifying
civilization consciousness. Huntington further points that human beings are
divided along cultural lines - Western, Islamic, Hindu. There is no universal
civilization. Instead, there are these cultural blocks, each within its own
distinct set of values. This increased civilization consciousness makes the
differences between civilizations more apparent and will invigorate animosities
leading to conflict (Huntington 1993).
However Russett,
Oneal and Cox (2000) find that civilizational differences tell us little about
the likelihood that disputes would escalate to violence. These predictions by
Huntington are heavily criticised. Many argue that civilisations will not be
the basis for future conflict, but there is little agreement over what will be
the basis for post-Cold War conflict. Some, like Kirkpatrick et al (1993 Hunter
(1998), Kader (1998) argue that the civilisations Huntington describes are not
united and that most conflicts, both international and domestic, will be
between members of the same civilisations.
Huntington
(1993) argues that whereas conflicts during the Cold War were based mostly along the ideological
divide between the US and Soviet blocs of that era, in the post-Cold War era
most conflicts will occur along civilizational lines and these conflicts will
be particularly intense. Huntington divides the world into eight major
civilisations: Western, Confucian/Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu,
Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and ‘possibly ‘African which could mean civilizational
state failures will be more intense than non-civilisational state failures,
especially after the end of the Cold War.
People in the
Arab world do not share the general suppositions of the Western world. Their
primary attachment is to their religion, not to their nation-state. Their
culture is inhospitable to certain liberal ideals, like pluralism,
individualism and democracy.
Huntington
correctly foresaw that the Arab strongman regimes were fragile and were
threatened by the masses of unemployed young men. He thought these regimes
could fall, but he did not believe that the nations would modernize in a
Western direction. Amid the tumult of regime change, the rebels would
selectively borrow tools from the West, but their borrowing would be refracted
through their own beliefs. They would follow their own trajectory and not
become more Western.
The Muslim world has
bloody borders. There are wars and tensions where the Muslim world comes into conflict
with other civilizations. Huntington ‘s predictions can be said to be partly
correct in that Islamic groups may be ‘bloody’ but, by far, most of the blood
is shed within their borders. Conflicts involving only Islamic groups such as
the religious revolution in Algeria, the civil war in Afghanistan, and the
Kurdish rebellions against Iran, Iraq, and Turkey are the norm for conflicts
involving the Islamic civilisation, and conflicts like the civil wars in the
former Yugoslavia and Lebanon are in the minority.
Tipson (1997) and Walt
(1997), among others argue that Huntington’s predictions amount to a
self-fulfilling prophecy should be taken seriously especially in the wake of
the events of 11 September 2001. If predictions like those of Huntington combined
with the activities of groups like Al Qaeda,Al Shabaab succeed in convincing
Western policy makers that Islam is a threat, then it will be treated as one.
If this occurs, conflicts between the West and Islam would probably be given more
attention and provoke a more conflictive response from the West, making escalation
more likely and peaceful resolution less common than may otherwise have been
likely. However, Islamic groups do account for the greatest number of conflict
years both during and after the Cold War.
Even if decrepit
regimes fell, Huntington suggested, there would still be a fundamental clash of
civilizations between Islam and the West. The Western nations would do well to
keep their distance from Muslim affairs, without the common threat of communism
the West and Muslim now perceive each other as enemies and increased
communication and interaction between the two civilisations has exaggerated the
perceived differences between the two societies. The more the two civilizations
intermingle, the worse the tensions will be. Chinese civilization is seen as a
larger threat to the West once .
Chinese culture
collides with the American interests regarding the non-existence of a regional
power in Southeast Asia. Islamic civilization is considered as a potential
Chinese ally,
Domestic conflicts have
become increasingly important in the international arena for several reasons.
First, since the end of the Cold War, a greater proportion of conflicts are
internal ones (Carment and James 1997; David1997).For example severe state
failures such as those in Congo-Kinshasa, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and
Burundi have often crossed borders to destabilise entire regions. Weinberg and
Eubank (1999) and Weinberg, Eubank and Pedahzur (2002) found that, in the 1980s
and 1990s, terrorism was becoming more civilizational. In particular, most
terrorism was by Islamic groups against non-Muslims and most new terrorist
organisations were Islamic.
The Soviet-Afghan war
and the first Gulf War marked the emergence of civilisational wars. Huntington
interpreted the Afghan War as a civilization war because it was seen as the
first successful resistance to a foreign power, which boosted the
self-confidence and power of many fighters in the Islamic world, leaving behind
an uneasy coalition of Islamic organizations intent on promoting Islam against
all non-Muslim forces, perceiving the West as a major threat to their way of
life.
The Hindu and
Confucian/Sinic civilisations had a greater proportion of civilizational
conflicts than did the Islamic civilisation. Based on the criteria of proportion
of conflict years which are civilizational in the post-Cold War era, it is the
Confucian/Sinic civilisation which has the ‘bloodiest’ borders, with 72% of its
conflicts being civilizational. However, the absolute number of civilizational conflict
years involving the Islamic civilisation is greater than that of any other civilisation,
but this can be explained as a part of the general tendency of that civilisation
to engage in conflict. Huntington asserts the increased role and importance of
religion in world politics and this has been evident in the clash of religions
such as the Jews and Christians, Muslims, Islam and Hindus in Asian and African
countries.
According to Weinberg,
Eubank and Pedahzur (2002) in the 1980s
and 1990s,terrorism was becoming more civilisational. In particular, most
terrorism was by Islamic groups against non-Muslims and most new terrorist
organisations were Islamic. However, this is by no means conclusive in that it shows
only that Muslim groups tend to choose terrorism as a tactic. It does not
include other types of violence including guerrilla warfare and high-intensity
civil war. That the studies mentioned above (as well as the results of this
study), which include several types of domestic conflict, do not confirm this
result indicates that domestic conflict, in general, is not civilizational .
Huntington further
emphasizes the rise in power and influence of non-western countries against
Western civilisation and struggling for economic power. Davis and Moore (1997)
find a connection between international ethnic alliances and international
conflict. While this provides some confirmation for Huntington’s predictions of
civilizational influence in conflicts, For example the four tigers (hong
kong,Taiwan,south korea,Singapore) and China which have asserted cultural
relevance through economic successes. Asian countries are decreasingly
responsive to United States demands and interests and have resisted pressure from
the Western countries.
The Asian ability to
successfully modernize and develop economically without adopting western values
supports Huntington’s thesis that the world is becoming less Westernised. Further
he postulates that a new structure of civilisation as centred on a small number
of powerful core states. Culture commonality legitimates the leadership and
order-imposing role of the core state for both member states and core external
powers and institutions. For example core states in the globe may refer to
France , Germany for the EU. Their sphere of influence ends in Western Christendom.
Thus to say civilisations are strictly bound to religious affiliation.
However other critics
of Huntington’s theory include: that Huntington got his facts wrong (Anwar 1998;
Hassner 1997. Kader 1998) or even ignored or bent the facts to fit his theory
(Pfaff 1997;Hassner 1997b); that his theory is an oversimplification (Hassner
1997a; Pfaff1997); that his list of civilisations is incorrect (Beedham 1999;
Pfaff 1997,Tipson 1997); that he often contradicts himself , that his evidence
is wholly anecdotal, leaving room for others to cite counterexamples (Gurr
1994; Halliday 1997); that he provides no systematic analysis of the link
between civilisational controversies and political behaviour (Senghass 1998;
Walt 1997); and that his predictions amount to self-fulfilling prophecies.
Russett, Oneal and
Cox’s (2000) study on militarised interstate disputes from 1992 to 2000 finds among other things that intra-civilizational
conflicts were more likely than inter-civilizational conflicts, civilizational
conflicts if anything declined as the Cold War ended and that Huntington’s
‘West versus the rest’ and ‘Islamic threat to the West’ predictions were
unfounded. They also show that, while civilizational variables are not
important, aspects of the realist and liberal theories are important predictors
of international conflict. These findings are also consistent with those of
Henderson (1998) that cultural factors do not have a unidirectional impact on
international war.
Henderson and Tucker
(2001) found that, if anything civilizational differences make states less
likely to go to war. Singer (2000) show that political factors have a greater influence on
civil wars than cultural ones. Gurr (1994) found no support for Huntington’s
theory among major ethno-political conflicts. Ellingsen (2000) found that there
is no real change in the dynamics of ethnic conflict from the Cold War to the
post-Cold War eras. Fox (2001b, 2002) also found that, globally, there has been
little change in the ratio of civilisational versus non-civilisational ethnic
conflict since the end of the Cold War and that there has also been little
change in Islamic involvement in civilisational ethnic conflict since the end
of the Cold War.
Huntington might have
concluded that this large number of ‘West versus Islam’ conflicts is new to the
post-Cold War era. One possible answer is that although ‘Islamic versus
West’conflicts may have been more common during the Cold War, the psychology of
the Cold War could have obscured this fact. That is, many, if not most, policy
makers and academics in the West ideologically believed that its greatest enemy
was communism, and other conflicts were either considered less important or
were viewed in the context of the Cold War. Many internal conflicts took on
Cold War dimensions when both sides received support from either the Western or
Soviet blocs. Thus, perhaps, the end of the Cold War and the lifting of the
era’s ideological blinders allowed for a fresh look at the nature of world
conflict and patterns that had always been there, and were even in a decline
but were previously obscured by the imperatives of the Cold War, became evident
and were mistaken for being novel.
In conclusion Huntington’s
assertions, as well as the claims of those who disagree with him, is crucial.
How academics and policy makers choose to understand the nature of conflict in
the global era will probably influence the official policies toward future
conflict, and consequently the course of the conflicts themselves. While our
understanding of the nature of post-Cold War conflict is by no means complete,
and for that matter our understanding of conflict during the Cold War was also
probably incomplete. Accordingly, it is important that both academics and
policy makers seek new avenues of understanding conflict with the awareness
that what they expect to see can easily and unnecessarily be transformed into
reality.
References
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