Rwanda and Uganda's alleged financial and material support of M23 rebels a gross violation of International law?

The Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) has a long history of conflict, but its recent crises can be traced to the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  In response to violence carried out by exiled Rwandan Hutu genocidaires, Rwandan and Ugandan forces invaded the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1996.  In what came to be known as the First Congo War, Mobutu Sese Seko was overthrown and replaced by Laurent-Desire Kabila.  Beginning in 1998, Kabila accused Rwanda of exploiting the DRC’s minerals, and was aided by Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in a successful effort to push Rwandan and Ugandan forces out of the country.  The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of July 1999 attempted to end hostilities between nations, and was signed by Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda, as well as the DRC. Rwanda and Uganda`s alleged material and financial support for the M23 rebels in the DRC is a gross violation of International Law because, it is forbidden under the International Law for states to support rebel groups fighting a legitimate state. The two countries, Rwanda and Uganda did their actions without any fear of being prosecuted because under the International Law there is no central law enforcement agent or a central organ of law determination (courts). In November 1999, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which was tasked with supervising and implementing the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.  Despite its efforts, however, continued violence in the DRC resulted in the Second Congo War, which waged until the 2003 peace accords were signed between Uganda and the DRC.  Even though these accords officially ended the Second Congo War, a proxy war between Rwanda and Uganda continued until 2008.  With UN electoral assistance provided under the auspices of MONUC, the late President Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, became the first democratically-elected president of the DRC in 2006. On 23 March 2009, the Congres national pour la defense du peuple (CNDP, National Congress for the Defense of the People), a former rebel group led by Laurent Nkunda, signed a peace agreement with the Congolese government to reintegrate into the FARDC.  Three years later, former CNDP forces, complaining about the non-implementation of agreements to integrate political-military movements of the CNDP into the FARDC, and arguing that the government had thus only “feigned” its efforts at inclusivity, formed a new group called the M23.  Led by Ntaganda, the M23 was comprised of ethnic Tutsis and took its name from the date of the 23 March peace agreement in 2009.  Importantly, the M23 has also been allegedly backed by the Rwandan government, which, according to a 2012 Human Rights Watch report, has provided the M23 with forced Rwandan recruits, as well as weapons and ammunition.  Rwanda has also been accused of training child soldiers and luring them to fight for the M23, along with granting the M23 cross-border access into its territory. In November 2012, the M23 fought the FARDC and successfully took the major city of Goma, located in the North Kivu province, effectively forcing civilians to flee the area.  According to a UN Joint Human Rights Office report on the incident, which identifies 135 documented cases of sexual violence, M23 rebels committed acts of sexual violence and other human rights abuses against civilians in Goma during its seizure of the town.  During the M23’s seizure of Goma, the FARDC committed human rights abuses as well, including mass rape and arbitrary executions.  Notably, in November 2013, thirty-nine Congolese officers were tried for rape and acts of sexual violence in a 2012 incident. The M23’s seizure of Goma was condemned by the UNSC, which passed a resolution demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities.  As such, a week and a half later, the M23 agreed to withdraw its forces and negotiate with the FARDC.  The withdrawal was negotiated at a conference in Uganda, where heads of state in the region, including Rwanda and Uganda, were present.  During negotiations, the M23 highlighted several conditions that would need to be met in order for it to leave the town: namely, that the Congolese army would also disarm its troops in Goma, and that various Congolese political prisoners would be released.  Eventually, in December 2012, the M23 pulled of Goma.  In April 2013, the Kampala peace talks that had begun on 9 December 2012 after the M23’s departure from Goma broke down, as the Congolese government and M23 rebels were unable to agree on the implementation of a ceasefire.  This pattern of stalled negotiations continued through the fall of 2013. In the wake of the most recent suspension of peace talks in October 2013, FARDC and M23 forces continued to clash.  On the weekend of 25-26 October 2013 in particular, with both sides claiming the other was responsible for initiating violence, M23 rebels and the Congolese army attacked each other near Goma.  The following week, the UN announced that after a strong push by the FARDC, the M23 rebels were “all but finished.”  On 30 October 2013, the M23 was finally driven from its last stronghold in the eastern town of Bunagana, and five days later, it declared a cessation of hostilities.  On 5 November 2013, the M23 rebels completely surrendered, and a peace deal was signed on 12 December 2013. According to the Global Centre for R2P, however, the M23’s demise does not mean the conflict in the DRC is over.  Indeed, the Congolese government’s specific attention on the M23 in the past 20 months has come at the price of allowing other rebel groups to rise to prominence.  Focusing primarily on the M23 has allowed the FDLR and Maï-Maï Sheka in particular to strengthen and regroup.  For example, the Enough Project underscores that although the FDLR had weakened by 2012, the Congolese government’s focus on the M23 rebellion provided the FDLR with a “much-needed reprieve” that enabled it to regroup and strengthen its initiatives. The Maï-Maï Sheka also reorganized itself, allegedly with the help of the Rwandan military, in the spring of 2012. On 26 March 2013, Refugees International issued a report entitled “DR Congo: Outdated Approach, Misplaced Priorities,” which documents the plight of those who have been displaced in the Kivus due to M23 rebel violence.  In addition, International Crisis Group’s report from July 2013 underscored that the root of conflict in the DRC is local land disputes, and recommended that resolving these land issues be a component of subsequent peace talks.  In its 23 August 2013 report, Amnesty International also identified the imperative need to better protect civilians from M23 attacks.  Similarly, on 2 October 2013, Human Rights Watch wrote an open letter to the UNSC, urging the Council to refuse to accept agreements that included amnesty for M23 fighters, as well as to adopt a resolution requiring Rwanda to discontinue its support for the M23, among other requests. The horrific human rights abuses have been continually committed in the DRC, notably since the start of the First Congo War in 1998.  Some of the greatest concerns have been over the recruitment of child soldiers, sexual violence, and the murder of civilians.  A parallel issue, however, is the larger security concern in the DRC, as violence in the Congo has spread instability to other states in the region, namely Rwanda and Uganda.  As such, the UN and wider international community have also been greatly involved in seeking a resolution to the DRC conflict, specifically in the past decade. The DRC Sanctions Committee was established in 2004, pursuant to the adoption of Resolution 1533.  In 2012, the Committee’s Group of Experts found that both the Ugandan and Rwandan governments had violated terms of the arms embargo, a conclusion it again reached in its official July 2013 report.  Another underlying issue regarding Rwanda, as outlined in a 2013 Enough Project report, is its position as a transit point for minerals extracted from the DRC.  While Rwanda has denied its involvement in resource exploitation in the DRC, its drastic 69 percent increase in exports from 2012 to 2013 could not have been achieved within Rwandan territory alone.  Minerals from the DRC have also been transported through Uganda. Another confounding element of Rwanda’s role in the DRC is the General Assembly’s (GA) decision to name Rwanda to one of the five rotational seats in the Security Council for the 2013-2014 year.  Given Rwanda’s longtime connections to and support of M23 rebels in the eastern DRC conflict, some consider the GA’s decision to be hypocritical.  An October 2013 Human Rights Watch open letter to the UNSC also emphasized Rwanda’s role in supporting the M23 rebels, including its provision of weapons, ammunition, and other supplies; the deployment of Rwandan army troops to the DRC to fight alongside the M23; and the forcible recruitment of Rwandan men and children to fight for the M23. In August 2013, the United States warned that further targeted sanctions would be in store for the M23 and any groups that assisted them, should the violence continue.  This threat was substantiated when, in October 2013, the United States cut military aid to Rwanda for its support of the M23 rebels and their alleged recruitment of child soldiers in the DRC.  Britain and the European Union did the same. However, if Rwanda and Uganda had supported the DRC government with the same support there would be no major problem because under the International Law on collective self defence, a country may invite another country to help it preserve its sovereignty , for example Zimbabwe was invited by DRC in 1998. It must also be noted that a country may invite another country for assistance only in terms of war. In September 1998 Zimbabwean forces flown into Kinshasa held off a rebel advance that reached the outskirts of the capital, while Angolan units attacked northward from its borders and eastward from the Angolan territory of Cabinda, against the besieging rebel forces. This intervention by various nations saved the Kabila government and pushed the rebel front lines away from the capital. References Bavier, J (2008) Congo war-driven crisis kills 45 000 a month-study, Reuters. Bennett, C (2008) Rape in a lawless land, The Guardian (London). Retrieved 27 March 2010. Harris, D (2009) Children in Congo forced into exorcisms. World (USA today). Retrieved on                             24 April 2011 Human Rights Report (2010) Country Reports on Human Practices. US Department of State.                                                  Retrieved 24 April 2011. John, D (1982) The Cambridge history of Africa: From the earliest times to c. 500 BC,                           Cambridge University Press. McLaughlin, A and Woodside, D (2004) Rumblings of war in heart of Africa. The Christian                                                                    Science Monotor.   Prunier, G (2009) From Genocide to Continental War: The Congolese Conflict and the Crisis                              of Contemporary Africa, C. Hurst & Co.    UN Report (2012) The Countries helped the rebels secure DR Congo`s Goma.