Analysing the cause of conflicts in the globe;Samuel Huntington.

Conflict is defined as any episode of sustained violence in which national, ethnic, and religious or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in status (Bates et. al. 2003 . Huntington defines civilisations as the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of what distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined by both common language, history, religion, customs, institutions and by the subjective self-identification of people.(Huntington)(19993)

He further  states that in the future conflicts will occur along the cultural fault lines separating civilizations. It is thought that the increased ease of global communication will lead to more interactions between people of different cultures, thus intensifying civilization consciousness. Huntington further points that human beings are divided along cultural lines - Western, Islamic, Hindu. There is no universal civilization. Instead, there are these cultural blocks, each within its own distinct set of values. This increased civilization consciousness makes the differences between civilizations more apparent and will invigorate animosities leading to conflict (Huntington 1993).

However Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000) find that civilizational differences tell us little about the likelihood that disputes would escalate to violence. These predictions by Huntington are heavily criticised. Many argue that civilisations will not be the basis for future conflict, but there is little agreement over what will be the basis for post-Cold War conflict. Some, like Kirkpatrick et al (1993 Hunter (1998), Kader (1998) argue that the civilisations Huntington describes are not united and that most conflicts, both international and domestic, will be between members of the same civilisations.

Huntington (1993) argues that whereas conflicts during the Cold War  were based mostly along the ideological divide between the US and Soviet blocs of that era, in the post-Cold War era most conflicts will occur along civilizational lines and these conflicts will be particularly intense. Huntington divides the world into eight major civilisations: Western, Confucian/Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, and ‘possibly ‘African which could mean civilizational state failures will be more intense than non-civilisational state failures, especially after the end of the Cold War.

People in the Arab world do not share the general suppositions of the Western world. Their primary attachment is to their religion, not to their nation-state. Their culture is inhospitable to certain liberal ideals, like pluralism, individualism and democracy.

Huntington correctly foresaw that the Arab strongman regimes were fragile and were threatened by the masses of unemployed young men. He thought these regimes could fall, but he did not believe that the nations would modernize in a Western direction. Amid the tumult of regime change, the rebels would selectively borrow tools from the West, but their borrowing would be refracted through their own beliefs. They would follow their own trajectory and not become more Western.

The Muslim world has bloody borders. There are wars and tensions where the Muslim world comes into conflict with other civilizations. Huntington ‘s predictions can be said to be partly correct in that Islamic groups may be ‘bloody’ but, by far, most of the blood is shed within their borders. Conflicts involving only Islamic groups such as the religious revolution in Algeria, the civil war in Afghanistan, and the Kurdish rebellions against Iran, Iraq, and Turkey are the norm for conflicts involving the Islamic civilisation, and conflicts like the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia and Lebanon are in the minority.

Tipson (1997) and Walt (1997), among others argue that Huntington’s predictions amount to a self-fulfilling prophecy should be taken seriously especially in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001. If predictions like those of Huntington combined with the activities of groups like Al Qaeda,Al Shabaab succeed in convincing Western policy makers that Islam is a threat, then it will be treated as one. If this occurs, conflicts between the West and Islam would probably be given more attention and provoke a more conflictive response from the West, making escalation more likely and peaceful resolution less common than may otherwise have been likely. However, Islamic groups do account for the greatest number of conflict years both during and after the Cold War.

Even if decrepit regimes fell, Huntington suggested, there would still be a fundamental clash of civilizations between Islam and the West. The Western nations would do well to keep their distance from Muslim affairs, without the common threat of communism the West and Muslim now perceive each other as enemies and increased communication and interaction between the two civilisations has exaggerated the perceived differences between the two societies. The more the two civilizations intermingle, the worse the tensions will be. Chinese civilization is seen as a larger threat to the West once .

Chinese culture collides with the American interests regarding the non-existence of a regional power in Southeast Asia. Islamic civilization is considered as a potential Chinese ally,

Domestic conflicts have become increasingly important in the international arena for several reasons. First, since the end of the Cold War, a greater proportion of conflicts are internal ones (Carment and James 1997; David1997).For example severe state failures such as those in Congo-Kinshasa, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Burundi have often crossed borders to destabilise entire regions. Weinberg and Eubank (1999) and Weinberg, Eubank and Pedahzur (2002) found that, in the 1980s and 1990s, terrorism was becoming more civilizational. In particular, most terrorism was by Islamic groups against non-Muslims and most new terrorist organisations were Islamic.

The Soviet-Afghan war and the first Gulf War marked the emergence of civilisational wars. Huntington interpreted the Afghan War as a civilization war because it was seen as the first successful resistance to a foreign power, which boosted the self-confidence and power of many fighters in the Islamic world, leaving behind an uneasy coalition of Islamic organizations intent on promoting Islam against all non-Muslim forces, perceiving the West as a major threat to their way of life.

The Hindu and Confucian/Sinic civilisations had a greater proportion of civilizational conflicts than did the Islamic civilisation. Based on the criteria of proportion of conflict years which are civilizational in the post-Cold War era, it is the Confucian/Sinic civilisation which has the ‘bloodiest’ borders, with 72% of its conflicts being civilizational. However, the absolute number of civilizational conflict years involving the Islamic civilisation is greater than that of any other civilisation, but this can be explained as a part of the general tendency of that civilisation to engage in conflict. Huntington asserts the increased role and importance of religion in world politics and this has been evident in the clash of religions such as the Jews and Christians, Muslims, Islam and Hindus in Asian and African countries.

According to Weinberg, Eubank and Pedahzur (2002)  in the 1980s and 1990s,terrorism was becoming more civilisational. In particular, most terrorism was by Islamic groups against non-Muslims and most new terrorist organisations were Islamic. However, this is by no means conclusive in that it shows only that Muslim groups tend to choose terrorism as a tactic. It does not include other types of violence including guerrilla warfare and high-intensity civil war. That the studies mentioned above (as well as the results of this study), which include several types of domestic conflict, do not confirm this result indicates that domestic conflict, in general, is not civilizational .

Huntington further emphasizes the rise in power and influence of non-western countries against Western civilisation and struggling for economic power. Davis and Moore (1997) find a connection between international ethnic alliances and international conflict. While this provides some confirmation for Huntington’s predictions of civilizational influence in conflicts, For example the four tigers (hong kong,Taiwan,south korea,Singapore) and China which have asserted cultural relevance through economic successes. Asian countries are decreasingly responsive to United States demands and interests and have resisted pressure from the Western countries.

The Asian ability to successfully modernize and develop economically without adopting western values supports Huntington’s thesis that the world is becoming less Westernised. Further he postulates that a new structure of civilisation as centred on a small number of powerful core states. Culture commonality legitimates the leadership and order-imposing role of the core state for both member states and core external powers and institutions. For example core states in the globe may refer to France , Germany for the EU. Their sphere of influence ends in Western Christendom. Thus to say civilisations are strictly bound to religious affiliation.

However other critics of Huntington’s theory include: that Huntington got his facts wrong (Anwar 1998; Hassner 1997. Kader 1998) or even ignored or bent the facts to fit his theory (Pfaff 1997;Hassner 1997b); that his theory is an oversimplification (Hassner 1997a; Pfaff1997); that his list of civilisations is incorrect (Beedham 1999; Pfaff 1997,Tipson 1997); that he often contradicts himself , that his evidence is wholly anecdotal, leaving room for others to cite counterexamples (Gurr 1994; Halliday 1997); that he provides no systematic analysis of the link between civilisational controversies and political behaviour (Senghass 1998; Walt 1997); and that his predictions amount to self-fulfilling prophecies.

Russett, Oneal and Cox’s (2000) study on militarised interstate disputes from 1992 to 2000  finds among other things that intra-civilizational conflicts were more likely than inter-civilizational conflicts, civilizational conflicts if anything declined as the Cold War ended and that Huntington’s ‘West versus the rest’ and ‘Islamic threat to the West’ predictions were unfounded. They also show that, while civilizational variables are not important, aspects of the realist and liberal theories are important predictors of international conflict. These findings are also consistent with those of Henderson (1998) that cultural factors do not have a unidirectional impact on international war.

Henderson and Tucker (2001) found that, if anything civilizational differences make states less likely to go to war. Singer (2000) show that  political factors have a greater influence on civil wars than cultural ones. Gurr (1994) found no support for Huntington’s theory among major ethno-political conflicts. Ellingsen (2000) found that there is no real change in the dynamics of ethnic conflict from the Cold War to the post-Cold War eras. Fox (2001b, 2002) also found that, globally, there has been little change in the ratio of civilisational versus non-civilisational ethnic conflict since the end of the Cold War and that there has also been little change in Islamic involvement in civilisational ethnic conflict since the end of the Cold War.

Huntington might have concluded that this large number of ‘West versus Islam’ conflicts is new to the post-Cold War era. One possible answer is that although ‘Islamic versus West’conflicts may have been more common during the Cold War, the psychology of the Cold War could have obscured this fact. That is, many, if not most, policy makers and academics in the West ideologically believed that its greatest enemy was communism, and other conflicts were either considered less important or were viewed in the context of the Cold War. Many internal conflicts took on Cold War dimensions when both sides received support from either the Western or Soviet blocs. Thus, perhaps, the end of the Cold War and the lifting of the era’s ideological blinders allowed for a fresh look at the nature of world conflict and patterns that had always been there, and were even in a decline but were previously obscured by the imperatives of the Cold War, became evident and were mistaken for being novel.

In conclusion Huntington’s assertions, as well as the claims of those who disagree with him, is crucial. How academics and policy makers choose to understand the nature of conflict in the global era will probably influence the official policies toward future conflict, and consequently the course of the conflicts themselves. While our understanding of the nature of post-Cold War conflict is by no means complete, and for that matter our understanding of conflict during the Cold War was also probably incomplete. Accordingly, it is important that both academics and policy makers seek new avenues of understanding conflict with the awareness that what they expect to see can easily and unnecessarily be transformed into reality.

References

1. Ahari, M.E. 1997. ‘The Clash of Civilizations: An Old Story or New Truth.’ New Perspectives  Quarterly.

2. Ajami, F. 1993. ‘The Summoning.’  Foreign Affairs 72(4): 2–9.

3. Anwar, S.T. 1998. ‘Civilizations versus Civilizations in a New Multipolar World.’ Journal of Marketing 62(2): 125–8.

4. Bartley, R.L. 1993. ‘The Case for Optimism.’ Foreign Affairs 72(4): 15–18.

5. Beedham, B. 1999. ‘The New Geopolitics: A Fading Hell.’ The Economist Accessed 25/02/15.

6. HUNTINGTON, Samuel – «The Clash of Civilizations?. Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, n.º 3, 1993, pp. 22-49.

7. HUNTINGTON, Samuel – The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1996.

8. PARKER, John, RATHBONE, Richard – African History, a Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2007.

9. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clash_of_Civilizations

10. Henderson, E.A. and J.D. Singer. 2000. ‘Civil War in the Post-colonial World, 1946–92.’ Journal of  Peace Research. Accessed 20/02/15.

11. Henderson, E.A. and R. Tucker. 2001. ‘Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict.’ International Studies Quarterly 45.Accessed 20/02/15

13. Walt, S.N. 1997. ‘Building Up New  Bogeymen.’ Foreign Policy 106: 177–89.

14. Weinberg, L. and W. Eubank. 1999. ‘Terrorism and the Shape of Things to Come.’ Terrorism and Political Violence 11(4): 94–105.