The causes of identity conflicts include, the
inability of the state to perform its responsibilities owing to poor
leadership, endemic corruption, lopsided federal arrangements, poverty,
historical legacy and the inability to reverse the ills of history, elite
politics, ancient hatred and religious
differences among other causal factors. The
state’s weakness and fragility is the central cause of terror the world
over. For example, Nigeria has since inception as a federation been a fragile
and weak nation as in effect it is impossible to fully realize statehood and
development. The country operates a disaggregated union which does not
represent the desires of the people. In this writing examples shall be drawn
from Lesotho, Tunisia, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo and other African states.
Identity
conflicts involve contest between and amongst groups in the society. These can
be ethnic, tribal, religious or cultural
conflicting over economic, political and
social issues and resources, especially, where a group cannot or is prohibited
from pursuing or achieving its goals within the state. Demonstrations, riots
and even rebellions are tactics usually utilized to pursue their goals. They mostly
arise from competition for ownership of the state and control of its resources
and the expropriation of identity,
symbols and resources of the state by one group to the exclusion of other
structural violence, competition of state resources and relative depreciation,
security dilemma on the part of groups. The ultimate goal of these contests are
based on the need for allocation, reallocation, distribution of power, privileges
and resources which are done and carried out within crucial distributive decisions
(Baker, 1995:1; Ikelegbe and Okumu, 2010:21).
In
all human relations, contests and rivalries occur as human beings eke out
existence, they relate in competition over the limited resources nature offers
and those made by man himself. The contest over different preferences which are
sometimes carried out with high intensity of conflicts most often leads to
violence some of which are resolved peacefully or sometimes through violence.
Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant
of choices and decision (Zartman, 1997:197). Conflicts can be resource
based, when they manifest over limited resources. Ideological conflicts arise
from one’s ideology and identity, mismanagement of information which can
promote peace or conversely generate conflicts. The various types of conflicts
are broadly categorized as intra-state, internationalized intra state and inter-state.
(Miller, 2005).
Conflict
and peace are therefore mechanisms for realizing goals and for resolving
disparities in preferences in culture, value, ideology, religion and belief
systems. This exclusionary form of politics is a major reason behind identity
conflicts all over the world particularly in a highly plural and heterogeneous
nation like Nigeria. For example, the deliberate economic discrimination
against what are seen as a privileged group, such as the Tamils in Sri Lanka,
has been evident. A classic issue is the question of minority language rights
or religious freedoms. The conflict over language rights in the Baltic states
between the local and Russian-speaking populations . The Sri Lankan conflict
has been fueled by the proximity and involvement of India; the Northern Ireland
conflict by the competing claims of Britain and the Irish Republic and the
involvement of Irish Americans; the Cyprus conflict is intertwined with the
dispute between Turkey and Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for
Negotiators Greece, and so on. Understanding these international dimensions is
key to any analysis of the conflict itself. Tension between “settler” and
“indigenous” groups is present in almost all states in which such terms are
meaningful. Indian
settlers
in Fiji; Chinese and Indians in Malaysia; Russians in the Baltics and Central
Asian Republics: all are examples of groups who are seen as being less than
fully legitimate members of a multi-ethnic state by their indigenous
counterparts. The legacy of colonialism thus plays a role in many of the
current eruptions of identity-related conflict.
Market liberalisation and democratisation in
the 1990s substantially weakened the post-colonial state, ushering in new forms
of violence and disorder as the hallmark of the post-Cold War Africa. Although they often overflowed across national borders
and affected the neighbouring countries called the ‘bad neighbourhood’ syndrome (Young
2004:44). One example among many is the legacy left in Western Sahara by the
departing Spanish in 1975: an artificial frontier between Morocco and “Spanish
Sahara” which became the subject of a long dispute between the Moroccan state
and the Polisario Front, the army of the Saharawi people. Put simply, their
sense of themselves as a community – their ethnic identity – contradicted the
arbitrary map lines drawn by the colonizer, and they set about correcting the
map as soon as they were free to do so. A difference of identity, combined with
a dispute over territory, resulted in violent conflict, which remains
unresolved today. Similarly, as Britain left the Indian subcontinent in 1947,
bitter fighting erupted between identity groups organized along religious
lines. The result was the partitioning of the area between India and Pakistan.
But, as so often, simple partition has failed to satisfy the underlying
root-causes of the conflict: in Kashmir and
It
is true, as the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan
(1998:3), argues, that the ‘sources of conflict in Africa reflect diversity and
complexity. Africa’s ethnic diversity has been blamed for the escalation of
violent conflict and the implosion of the state. In the post-Cold War era, such
identities as Tutsi, Croats or Hindu have appeared armour-plated in deadly
combats that have mirrored Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilisations on a
global scale (Huntington 1996; Ross 2000; Deng 2005; Horowitz 1985). Ethnic identity on its own does not necessarily cause
or perpetuate violent conflict, it has become ‘a sort of universal shorthand
that marks a host of much more complex issues of identity and difference’
(Broch-Due 2005:6; Khazanov et al 2004). The greed-and-grievance thesis, has described
the link between the escalation of identity-based civil conflicts and the unfolding
war economies which feed and fuel them (Collier & Sambanis 2005; Elbadawi
& Sambanis 2000).
Despite,
it has become clear that identities have a role to play in conflict resolution.
Organisations like UNESCO (2005) and the African Union (2005) have embraced
cultural diversity and the expression of different identities as important assets
in peacemaking and nation building. Indeed, authors like Tan celebrate the
diversity of identities as an asset in the re-engineering of the civic order
(Tan 2006). Ethnicity therefore is not
in itself a venal force.
Following
the end of the Cold War, Africa became a theatre of violent conflicts from
Burundi to Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Sierra Leone,
Somalia to Rwanda and Guinea to Sudan. The indelible mark of the new wars is
that they are linked to identity, particularly ethnic identity. While there are
many identity markers such as race, nationhood, kinship, class, religion,
language, gender, age, geographic location, cultural preferences, and
occupation, such as military function or
herders and tillers. By and large ethnicity is identified as the dominant
axis about which conflicts have revolved.
This violence is seen as a return to barbarism
(Mamdani 2002). With the emergence of pluralist democracy, this violence has
been seen as a ploy by the incumbents to undermine democracy and perpetuate
themselves in power (Kagwanja 2001). Some scholars view the explosion of ethnic-based
violence in countries like Rwanda as a manifestation of the brutal legacy of
manipulation of ethnicity in the colonial past now returning to haunt the
post-colonial state (Mamdani 2001).
The
reason of identity wars is based on the fact that ethnic identity is indeed
particularly strong in traditional societies – embodying the deeply-embedded
sense of belonging to a group with unique identity markers, such as myths of
common ancestry, shared memories, cultural values, traditions and symbols, and
ownership of territory (Endalew 2002).
Ethnic
identity does not sufficiently explain communal
wars and homogeneous nations like Somalia have been engulfed in civil war while
many heterogeneous societies live in peace, (Osman:2007). Further, the so-called African traditional
identities are often recent constructions, either by colonial powers or by
their post-colonial successors, resulting in mythologies of Africanist cultures
(Banégas 2006; Bayart 2005).
Appadurai
(1998) explaining the implosion of ethnic-based violence and identity conflict is
linked to the forces of globalisation. He
noted that ethnic violence is deeply rooted in the uncertainties,
anxieties, disillusions and chaotic environments created by economic
globalisation. A case in point was the dehumanizing state of violence against citizens typified by the Nazi Holocaust or,
more recently, ethnic cleansing in the now defunct Yugoslavia. The violence is non-revolutionary
and ‘non-liberative. Another case in
point was the Rwandan genocide between the Hutu and Tutsi.
Above that, in Sudan when they came face to
face with this new form of violence, the leaders of the one-party state resorted to recruiting surrogates and clients
to organise violence against rebellious citizens. Mohamed Salih (1989) unveiled
how the Sudanese state recruited tribal militias to terrorise civilian
populations in a move that contributed to the ‘re-tribalisation’ of politics. Recently
the state recruited nearly one hundred
boys from thirteen years to save in the national army. The practice became
widespread in countries as diverse as Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi and
South Sudan.
They
are also linked to complex proxy wars involving regional powers. Ethnic
militias, combatants or bandits feed into ‘economies of war’ which are
inextricably connected to globalised illegal economic networks and contrabands
in precious metals, gemstones, drugs, guns and human trafficking. The war in
Somalia, for example, has also come to be linked to the longstanding conflict
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, with both protagonists underwriting and backing
rival forces within the country. Moreover, as the case of America’s involvement
in Somalia allegedly to root out the Union of Islamic Courts’ fighters shows,
what are viewed as internal wars are also linked to the ‘clash of
civilisations’ which now defines the parameters of the global war on terrorism.
Ethnicity
became central to the colonial divide-and-rule device used for the purpose of
political control, enforcement of taxes
and extraction of wealth (Broch-Due 2005; Rubin 2006). For example, the Belgian
and French ascribed the Hamitic ‘race’ identity to the Tutsis in Rwanda as
against the ‘Bantu tribal’ identity of the Hutus. This flawed classification
laid the foundation for ethnic rivalry and conflict which culminated to the
1994 genocide (Prunier 1997). The colonial manipulation of ethnicity bequeathed
Africa’s post-colonial societies with the polarities of settler and native categories. These have become the axis about
which ethnic violence in Rwanda or in
Kenya rotates (Mamdani 1996:201).
Africa’s
post-colonial states inherited these ethnic stereotypes and divisive patterns
of power between and within specific ethnic identities, thus sowing the seeds
of competition and conflict along ethnic fault-lines. It did not help the
matter that many post-colonial patrimonial elites continued this legacy of
divide-and-rule to protect their power. The decline of the hegemonic state and
socio-citizenship opened the vent for rival ethnic groups to challenge the
authority of the central state and the ruling elite.
With
the collapse of the nationalist consensus that ushered Africa into independence,
the one-party state was widely imposed across the continent as a single
identity group or a coalition of several identity groups. Corruption and lack
of accountability became the norm as pressure intensified on public servants to
use their civic positions to satisfy their own imperatives of sharing resources
with members of their larger communities. With no other recourse, those
communities that felt excluded from the state and discriminated against by the
dominant group often resorted to violent tactics. This happens especially when the
stakes for survival are heightened by democratic competition diminishing economic
opportunities, livelihoods and increasing poverty.
The
predatory nature of the African state, where the dominant elite appropriates
and personalises the state, using it as an instrument of self-enrichment and of
rewarding ethnic kith and kin clients. Indeed, rebel movements such as those
led by Savimbi in Angola and Sankoh in Sierra Leone reflected this pattern in
Africa. Similarly, with the emergence of multi-party politics in many parts of
Africa, opposition political parties have bias around their ethnic base (Prah
2004).
More
often than not, the African state has been too weak and dysfunctional to act as
a neutral arbiter in enforcing authority
based on a common notion of civic citizenship. Its economic weakness and
endemic lack of resources and infrastructure have eroded the capacity of the
state
to
exert its control and suppress any challenge to its authority, especially by
identity groups in peripheral areas which tend to back rebels (Faeron &
Laitin 2003:80). A case in point is the
inability of successive weak governments in the Democratic Republic of Congo to effectively contain rebellions in
parts such as the Kivu region. Cross border ethnic identities and alliances
have also tended to exacerbate the problem of central authority in the
periphery areas. This is typical of the Great Lakes region where neighbouring
states have hosted hostile rebel groups (Mamdani 2002). Again, Nigeria is
suffering the same fate from Boko Haram a terrorist group that have ravaged the
state for more than a decade.
Similarly,
lack of modern institutions such as constitutions or independent judiciaries
have denied identity groups of credible channels through which to address their
grievances and quests for equity, fairness and justice. A case in point was the
Tunisian and Kenyan situations before the introduction of new constitutions.
Conflicts wee rampant along ethnic and identity lines. Apart from their
weakness, dysfunctionality and predatory nature, African states have hosted existing regimes
of resource-exploitation which have tended to transform identities into
instruments of conflict.
Broch-Due
(2005:2) rightly notes that ‘as resources dwindle and relations of wealth are
reconfigured in the wake of violence, identities and ideas of belonging become
the focal arenas of conflict and negotiation’. However, poverty in itself is not a trigger of
identity-based violence. Indeed, a number of poor nations in Africa have not
suffered any civil war or serious challenge to the state. Africa’s army of
unemployed youth have become easy recruits by rebel groups, which offer
attractive promises of employment alternatives in situations of abject poverty
and powerlessness, the case in point is Boko Haram militant group in Nigeria, Al-shabab in Somalia and Al-Qaida in Syria are
examples of this situation. Conversely, countries like Botswana, which have
sufficient wealth, above-average income and small populations have tended to be
less conflict prone.
Appadurai
(1998) traced the roots of the brutal surge of ethnic violence in Latin America,
Eastern Europe and Africa to the uncertainties, anxieties, disillusions and chaotic
environments created by economic globalisation. In this respect Africa’s civil
conflicts are not only heavily dependent on local depredation, but also on
global linkages and support. For example, conflicts in the Great Lakes region
constitute a complex conflict with local, regional and global linkages.
Africa
witnessed increasing involvement of mercenary companies in civil wars in
Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in ways
that carry eerie memories of colonial pillage and violence. Widely cited is the
role of two British mercenary companies, Sandline International and Executive
Outcomes, which aided militias in Sierra Leone to secure access to
mineral-producing areas in return for direct payments and commercial
concessions (Storey 1999:39-56). Notably, the area controlled by Liberia’s
warlord, Charles Taylor, in Sierra Leone and Liberia is said to have been the
third largest supplier of hard wood to France in the 1990s. The lucrative
commerce in timber and ‘blood diamonds’ in West African conflicts also tended
to reinforce the claim that markets are capable of thriving without states at
all. This view of markets in corrupt states privileges the profits of war over
the human rights of the people trapped in these cycles of conflict. (Broch-Due
2005:3).
Nigeria
is a plural and heterogeneous nation comprising of multi ethnic and multi
religious groups. The history of the country has been replete with identity
related issues and conflicts. Communities, clans and religious groups have
taken up arms against one another in devastating dimensions. A case in point are
the conflicts, violence and terror that have rocked the Jos Plateau in the last
two decades, including the most disturbing ongoing Boko Haram. It has led to terror
in the northern part of the country and it has not only threatened the nation’s
security and overall corporate existence as a single indivisible entity but has
exposed the fragility of the nation.
The
Nigerian state has a high level of
unemployment that stood at 23 per cent at mid 2012 and even higher among the youths
with about 38 per cent pervades the
country’ s economy. Fiscal problems, debts and low economic growth also remain
dominant features of the country. (Okonjo – Iweala, 2012; Adeyeye, 2011; Sani,
2011; Almond, 2008; Amuwo, 2010; Adejumobi, 2001; Ibeanu, 1999; Abdul, 2002;,
2006, Falola, 2008; and CPI, UNHDI 2011). While identity violence has tended to
aid the course of globalisation in Africa in cruel ways, this linkage between
localised conflict and globalisation has undermined citizenship and human
rights of the African people.
In
conclusion, identity and ethnic conflicts are rampant across the globe. These
are caused by a variety of factors which
include poor leadership or resource allocation among different ethnic
groups. These were common since time immemorial, for instance in Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the
end of the Cold War, left large
populations of Russian speakers in a number of new republics in the Baltics,
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, many of whom became a focus for the
long-standing grievances of the indigenous populations. Discrimination and
conflict between Russians and local populations became a potent issue in a
number of these states, with language and citizenship rights an area of
particular concern. Again the effects of globalisation also
contributed to the rise of identity conflicts as states tried to grapple with
various challenges.
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