Identity based conflicts in the globe

 The causes of identity conflicts include, the inability of the state to perform its responsibilities owing to poor leadership, endemic corruption, lopsided federal arrangements, poverty, historical legacy and the inability to reverse the ills of history, elite politics, ancient  hatred and religious differences among other causal factors. The  state’s weakness and fragility is the central cause of terror the world over. For example, Nigeria has since inception as a federation been a fragile and weak nation as in effect it is impossible to fully realize statehood and development. The country operates a disaggregated union which does not represent the desires of the people. In this writing examples shall be drawn from Lesotho, Tunisia, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of  Congo and other African states.

Identity conflicts involve contest between and amongst groups in the society. These can be  ethnic, tribal, religious or cultural conflicting  over economic, political and social issues and resources, especially, where a group cannot or is prohibited from pursuing or achieving its goals within the state. Demonstrations, riots and even rebellions are tactics usually utilized to pursue their goals. They mostly arise from competition for ownership of the state and control of its resources and the expropriation of  identity, symbols and resources of the state by one group to the exclusion of other structural violence, competition of state resources and relative depreciation, security dilemma on the part of groups. The ultimate goal of these contests are based on the need for allocation, reallocation, distribution of power, privileges and resources which are done and carried out within crucial distributive decisions (Baker, 1995:1; Ikelegbe and Okumu, 2010:21).

In all human relations, contests and rivalries occur as human beings eke out existence, they relate in competition over the limited resources nature offers and those made by man himself. The contest over different preferences which are sometimes carried out with high intensity of conflicts most often leads to violence some of which are resolved peacefully or sometimes through violence. Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decision (Zartman, 1997:197). Conflicts can be resource based, when they manifest over limited resources. Ideological conflicts arise from one’s ideology and identity, mismanagement of information which can promote peace or conversely generate conflicts. The various types of conflicts are broadly categorized as intra-state, internationalized intra state and inter-state. (Miller, 2005).

Conflict and peace are therefore mechanisms for realizing goals and for resolving disparities in preferences in culture, value, ideology, religion and belief systems. This exclusionary form of politics is a major reason behind identity conflicts all over the world particularly in a highly plural and heterogeneous nation like Nigeria. For example, the deliberate economic discrimination against what are seen as a privileged group, such as the Tamils in Sri Lanka, has been evident. A classic issue is the question of minority language rights or religious freedoms. The conflict over language rights in the Baltic states between the local and Russian-speaking populations . The Sri Lankan conflict has been fueled by the proximity and involvement of India; the Northern Ireland conflict by the competing claims of Britain and the Irish Republic and the involvement of Irish Americans; the Cyprus conflict is intertwined with the dispute between Turkey and Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators Greece, and so on. Understanding these international dimensions is key to any analysis of the conflict itself. Tension between “settler” and “indigenous” groups is present in almost all states in which such terms are meaningful. Indian

settlers in Fiji; Chinese and Indians in Malaysia; Russians in the Baltics and Central Asian Republics: all are examples of groups who are seen as being less than fully legitimate members of a multi-ethnic state by their indigenous counterparts. The legacy of colonialism thus plays a role in many of the current eruptions of identity-related conflict.

 Market liberalisation and democratisation in the 1990s substantially weakened the post-colonial state, ushering in new forms of violence and disorder as the hallmark of the post-Cold War Africa. Although  they often overflowed across national borders and affected the neighbouring countries called  the ‘bad neighbourhood’ syndrome (Young 2004:44). One example among many is the legacy left in Western Sahara by the departing Spanish in 1975: an artificial frontier between Morocco and “Spanish Sahara” which became the subject of a long dispute between the Moroccan state and the Polisario Front, the army of the Saharawi people. Put simply, their sense of themselves as a community – their ethnic identity – contradicted the arbitrary map lines drawn by the colonizer, and they set about correcting the map as soon as they were free to do so. A difference of identity, combined with a dispute over territory, resulted in violent conflict, which remains unresolved today. Similarly, as Britain left the Indian subcontinent in 1947, bitter fighting erupted between identity groups organized along religious lines. The result was the partitioning of the area between India and Pakistan. But, as so often, simple partition has failed to satisfy the underlying root-causes of the conflict: in Kashmir and

It is true, as the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan (1998:3), argues, that the ‘sources of conflict in Africa reflect diversity and complexity. Africa’s ethnic diversity has been blamed for the escalation of violent conflict and the implosion of the state. In the post-Cold War era, such identities as Tutsi, Croats or Hindu have appeared armour-plated in deadly combats that have mirrored Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilisations on a global scale (Huntington 1996; Ross 2000; Deng 2005; Horowitz 1985). Ethnic  identity on its own does not necessarily cause or perpetuate violent conflict, it has become ‘a sort of universal shorthand that marks a host of much more complex issues of identity and difference’ (Broch-Due 2005:6; Khazanov et al 2004). The greed-and-grievance thesis, has described the link between the escalation of identity-based civil conflicts and the unfolding war economies which feed and fuel them (Collier & Sambanis 2005; Elbadawi & Sambanis 2000).

Despite, it has become clear that identities have a role to play in conflict resolution. Organisations like UNESCO (2005) and the African Union (2005) have embraced cultural diversity and the expression of different identities as important assets in peacemaking and nation building. Indeed, authors like Tan celebrate the diversity of identities as an asset in the re-engineering of the civic order (Tan 2006). Ethnicity  therefore is not in itself a venal force.

Following the end of the Cold War, Africa became a theatre of violent conflicts from Burundi to Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Sierra Leone, Somalia to Rwanda and Guinea to Sudan. The indelible mark of the new wars is that they are linked to identity, particularly ethnic identity. While there are many identity markers such as race, nationhood, kinship, class, religion, language, gender, age, geographic location, cultural preferences, and occupation,  such as military function or herders and tillers.  By  and large ethnicity is identified as the dominant axis about which conflicts have revolved.

 This violence is seen as a return to barbarism (Mamdani 2002). With the emergence of pluralist democracy, this violence has been seen as a ploy by the incumbents to undermine democracy and perpetuate themselves in power (Kagwanja 2001). Some  scholars view the explosion of ethnic-based violence in countries like Rwanda as a manifestation of the brutal legacy of manipulation of ethnicity in the colonial past now returning to haunt the post-colonial state (Mamdani 2001).

The reason of identity wars is based on the fact that ethnic identity is indeed particularly strong in traditional societies – embodying the deeply-embedded sense of belonging to a group with unique identity markers, such as myths of common ancestry, shared memories, cultural values, traditions and symbols, and ownership of territory (Endalew 2002).

Ethnic  identity does not sufficiently explain communal wars and homogeneous nations like Somalia have been engulfed in civil war while many heterogeneous societies live in peace,  (Osman:2007). Further, the so-called African traditional identities are often recent constructions, either by colonial powers or by their post-colonial successors, resulting in mythologies of Africanist cultures (Banégas 2006; Bayart 2005).

Appadurai (1998) explaining the implosion of ethnic-based violence and identity conflict is linked to the forces of globalisation. He  noted that ethnic violence is deeply rooted in the uncertainties, anxieties, disillusions and chaotic environments created by economic globalisation. A case in point was the dehumanizing state of  violence against  citizens typified by the Nazi Holocaust or, more recently, ethnic cleansing in the now defunct Yugoslavia. The violence is non-revolutionary and ‘non-liberative.  Another case in point was the Rwandan genocide between the Hutu and Tutsi.

 Above that, in Sudan when they came face to face with this new form of violence, the leaders of the one-party state  resorted to recruiting surrogates and clients to organise violence against rebellious citizens. Mohamed Salih (1989) unveiled how the Sudanese state recruited tribal militias to terrorise civilian populations in a move that contributed to the ‘re-tribalisation’ of politics. Recently the state recruited nearly one hundred  boys from thirteen years to save in the national army. The practice became widespread in countries as diverse as Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi and South Sudan.

They are also linked to complex proxy wars involving regional powers. Ethnic militias, combatants or bandits feed into ‘economies of war’ which are inextricably connected to globalised illegal economic networks and contrabands in precious metals, gemstones, drugs, guns and human trafficking. The war in Somalia, for example, has also come to be linked to the longstanding conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, with both protagonists underwriting and backing rival forces within the country. Moreover, as the case of America’s involvement in Somalia allegedly to root out the Union of Islamic Courts’ fighters shows, what are viewed as internal wars are also linked to the ‘clash of civilisations’ which now defines the parameters of the global war on terrorism.

Ethnicity became central to the colonial divide-and-rule device used for the purpose of political control,  enforcement of taxes and extraction of wealth (Broch-Due 2005; Rubin 2006). For example, the Belgian and French ascribed the Hamitic ‘race’ identity to the Tutsis in Rwanda as against the ‘Bantu tribal’ identity of the Hutus. This flawed classification laid the foundation for ethnic rivalry and conflict which culminated to the 1994 genocide (Prunier 1997). The colonial manipulation of ethnicity bequeathed Africa’s post-colonial societies with the polarities of settler and native  categories. These have become the axis about which ethnic violence in Rwanda or  in Kenya rotates (Mamdani 1996:201).

Africa’s post-colonial states inherited these ethnic stereotypes and divisive patterns of power between and within specific ethnic identities, thus sowing the seeds of competition and conflict along ethnic fault-lines. It did not help the matter that many post-colonial patrimonial elites continued this legacy of divide-and-rule to protect their power. The decline of the hegemonic state and socio-citizenship opened the vent for rival ethnic groups to challenge the authority of the central state and the ruling elite.

With the collapse of the nationalist consensus that ushered Africa into independence, the one-party state was widely imposed across the continent as a single identity group or a coalition of several identity groups. Corruption and lack of accountability became the norm as pressure intensified on public servants to use their civic positions to satisfy their own imperatives of sharing resources with members of their larger communities. With no other recourse, those communities that felt excluded from the state and discriminated against by the dominant group often resorted to violent tactics. This happens especially when the stakes for survival are heightened by democratic competition diminishing economic opportunities, livelihoods and increasing poverty.

The predatory nature of the African state, where the dominant elite appropriates and personalises the state, using it as an instrument of self-enrichment and of rewarding ethnic kith and kin clients. Indeed, rebel movements such as those led by Savimbi in Angola and Sankoh in Sierra Leone reflected this pattern in Africa. Similarly, with the emergence of multi-party politics in many parts of Africa, opposition political parties have bias around their ethnic base (Prah 2004).

More often than not, the African state has been too weak and dysfunctional to act as a neutral arbiter in  enforcing authority based on a common notion of civic citizenship. Its economic weakness and endemic lack of resources and infrastructure have eroded the capacity of the state

to exert its control and suppress any challenge to its authority, especially by identity groups in peripheral areas which tend to back rebels (Faeron & Laitin 2003:80).  A case in point is the inability of successive weak governments in the Democratic Republic of  Congo to effectively contain rebellions in parts such as the Kivu region. Cross border ethnic identities and alliances have also tended to exacerbate the problem of central authority in the periphery areas. This is typical of the Great Lakes region where neighbouring states have hosted hostile rebel groups (Mamdani 2002). Again, Nigeria is suffering the same fate from Boko Haram a terrorist group that have ravaged the state for more than a decade.

Similarly, lack of modern institutions such as constitutions or independent judiciaries have denied identity groups of credible channels through which to address their grievances and quests for equity, fairness and justice. A case in point was the Tunisian and Kenyan situations before the introduction of new constitutions. Conflicts wee rampant along ethnic and identity lines. Apart from their weakness, dysfunctionality and predatory nature,  African states have hosted existing regimes of resource-exploitation which have tended to transform identities into instruments of conflict.

Broch-Due (2005:2) rightly notes that ‘as resources dwindle and relations of wealth are reconfigured in the wake of violence, identities and ideas of belonging become the focal arenas of conflict and negotiation’.  However, poverty in itself is not a trigger of identity-based violence. Indeed, a number of poor nations in Africa have not suffered any civil war or serious challenge to the state. Africa’s army of unemployed youth have become easy recruits by rebel groups, which offer attractive promises of employment alternatives in situations of abject poverty and powerlessness, the case in point is Boko Haram militant group in Nigeria,  Al-shabab in Somalia and Al-Qaida in Syria are examples of this situation. Conversely, countries like Botswana, which have sufficient wealth, above-average income and small populations have tended to be less conflict prone.

Appadurai (1998) traced the roots of the brutal surge of ethnic violence in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa to the uncertainties, anxieties, disillusions and chaotic environments created by economic globalisation. In this respect Africa’s civil conflicts are not only heavily dependent on local depredation, but also on global linkages and support. For example, conflicts in the Great Lakes region constitute a complex conflict with local, regional and global linkages.

Africa witnessed increasing involvement of mercenary companies in civil wars in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo in ways that carry eerie memories of colonial pillage and violence. Widely cited is the role of two British mercenary companies, Sandline International and Executive Outcomes, which aided militias in Sierra Leone to secure access to mineral-producing areas in return for direct payments and commercial concessions (Storey 1999:39-56). Notably, the area controlled by Liberia’s warlord, Charles Taylor, in Sierra Leone and Liberia is said to have been the third largest supplier of hard wood to France in the 1990s. The lucrative commerce in timber and ‘blood diamonds’ in West African conflicts also tended to reinforce the claim that markets are capable of thriving without states at all. This view of markets in corrupt states privileges the profits of war over the human rights of the people trapped in these cycles of conflict. (Broch-Due 2005:3).

Nigeria is a plural and heterogeneous nation comprising of multi ethnic and multi religious groups. The history of the country has been replete with identity related issues and conflicts. Communities, clans and religious groups have taken up arms against one another in devastating dimensions. A case in point are the conflicts, violence and terror that have rocked the Jos Plateau in the last two decades, including the most disturbing ongoing Boko Haram. It has led to terror in the northern part of the country and it has not only threatened the nation’s security and overall corporate existence as a single indivisible entity but has exposed the fragility of the nation.

The Nigerian state has a  high level of unemployment that stood at 23 per cent  at mid 2012 and even higher among the youths with  about 38 per cent pervades the country’ s economy. Fiscal problems, debts and low economic growth also remain dominant features of the country. (Okonjo – Iweala, 2012; Adeyeye, 2011; Sani, 2011; Almond, 2008; Amuwo, 2010; Adejumobi, 2001; Ibeanu, 1999; Abdul, 2002;, 2006, Falola, 2008; and CPI, UNHDI 2011). While identity violence has tended to aid the course of globalisation in Africa in cruel ways, this linkage between localised conflict and globalisation has undermined citizenship and human rights of the African people.

In conclusion, identity and ethnic conflicts are rampant across the globe. These are caused by a variety of factors which  include poor leadership or resource allocation among different ethnic groups. These were common since time immemorial, for instance in Europe,  the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War,  left large populations of Russian speakers in a number of new republics in the Baltics, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, many of whom became a focus for the long-standing grievances of the indigenous populations. Discrimination and conflict between Russians and local populations became a potent issue in a number of these states, with language and citizenship rights an area of particular  concern.  Again the effects of globalisation also contributed to the rise of identity conflicts as states tried to grapple with various challenges.

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