Zimbabwe's foreign policy;its effects on development

The foreign policy of a country can be defined as a set of goals that seek to outline how that country will interface at an official level with other countries of the world, and to a lesser extent, with non state actors in pursuit of its national economic, political, social and cultural interests (Jones: 1970).  In order to realise maximum benefit from its interaction with other countries, as well as to promote or influence some change in the policies, attitudes or actions of another state to achieve favourable goals, a country needs to also evaluate and monitor a broad spectrum of factors relating to those other countries.  Several factors determine a country’s capacity to wield power and influence in international relations as well as its strategic standing in the eyes of global powers and other countries.  These include its geographical location, population size, economic weight, possession of strategic resources such as oil, defence capability and track record in dealing with challenges such as terrorism.

In terms of international relations theory, one could say that Zimbabwe’s political objectives in the early 1980s were ‘realist’ in nature, this focus on the state itself, the most important factor being state power and state interest (Mandaza: 1986).  Historical experience has been a major determinant in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.  The overall experience of its struggle for liberation in the 1960s and 1970s was a formative influence on its foreign relations.  Zimbabwe got the backing of military and political support from socialist powers, principally China and the Soviet Union, and in a regional neighbourhood of apartheid South Africa and colonial Namibia, the major element in Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was support for liberation movements.  Another feature of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy was an expressed commitment to non-alignment.

It is recognized that foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy since it is the supreme national interest that drives the conception of a country’s foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2010).  Furthermore, the fundamental principles of national security, national economic well being and international image that transcend the government of the day formed the foundation of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy (ibid).

As a medium-sized African power, there are clear limits to the leverage Zimbabwe can bring to bear on regional and international affairs.  Early analysis of the external environment soon after independence in 1980 argued that the dominance of international finance capital and the imperatives of imperialist policy in Southern Africa defined the broad parameters of state action on the external front (Mandaza: 1986)

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy objectives are grounded in safeguarding the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the protection of its prestige and image, the pursuit of policies that improve the standard of living of all Zimbabweans wherever they are, and the creation and maintenance of an international environment conducive for the attainment of these goals (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2010)

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy since independence had Southern Africa as its centrepiece.  This was primarily due to the exigencies of liberation struggles in the 1980s in Namibia and South Africa and the destabilization campaigns of the apartheid regime, particularly in Mozambique and Angola.  Zimbabwe’s primary national interests were the safeguarding of its national security and the provision of diplomatic and material support to liberation movements.  In addition, key areas of its foreign policy revolved around economic cooperation in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) that was formed in 1980 and its successor organisation, SADC which was founded in 1992.

Zimbabwe needed to keep up trade with South Africa for economic reasons, yet on the other hand it too was housing ANC supporters.  Zimbabwe realised this, and decided that it needed regional support for this reason, Zimbabwe’s focus turned to regional diplomacy.  The country joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the early 1980s and President Mugabe became Chairman in 1986.  NAM stands for sovereignty, non-aggression, human rights and non-discrimination, among other principles.  The pressure that SADCC and NAM applied to Apartheid South Africa,  economic assistance to African nationalist parties and verbally stood in disagreement with Apartheid policies, supports this notion due to the fact that it influenced the creation of a democratic South Africa (NAM: 2005). 

As a member of SADCC, NAM and the UN, Zimbabwe exercised regional diplomacy and joined with other countries in isolating Apartheid South Africa.  When South Africa became independent in 1994, Zimbabwe now had to change its foreign policy approach to South Africa.  As the Zimbabwean economy weakened and the land issue worsened, the country became more and more reliant on its powerful neighbour (ibid).  Zimbabwe’s foreign policy towards South Africa from the 1980s to the present day has been affected by Apartheid, regional organisations and land.  Economically, the relationship has remained much the same from the Apartheid regime to today, with Zimbabwe relying on South Africa for support.

In order to protect its interests, Zimbabwe executed military intervention in Mozambique against RENAMO guerrillas between 1985 and 1992 (Hume: 1994).  Military intervention in Mozambique was an expression of political support to the FRELIMO government that had been active in supporting Zimbabwe’s own liberation struggle in the 1970s.  Another key objective was the protection of its major transport artery to the sea through the Beira Corridor.  Zimbabwe was a central player in peace negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

Zimbabwe’s foreign policy in Southern Africa during the first 15 years of independence was judged successfully, “by 1989, the Beira Corridor was safe”.  It was also President Mugabe who suggested Rome as the venue for the signing of the FRELIMO-RENAMO accord (Chan: 2003).   This Accord was viewed as a major triumph for Zimbabwean diplomacy.

Zimbabwe’s other major foreign policy challenge and military intervention was in the DRC, where Zimbabwe assisted the regime of Laurent Kabila in 1998.  The intervention caused divisions in SADC and among countries such as Rwanda and Uganda in the Great Lakes and drew condemnation from domestic and external sources.  There were both economic and political objectives in the deployment to assist Kabila.  The economic objective was to secure Inga Dam, from which Zimbabwe received a third of its electricity.  The political objective was to defence the territorial integrity of a SADC member state (Campbell: 2003) The DRC deployment gave the government another opportunity to represent itself as a regional political and military power.

In pursuit of multilateralism, Pan Africanism, good international citizenship, and peaceful resolution of conflicts, Zimbabwe participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Angola, Somalia and Uganda and Rwanda in the 1990s.  It also participated in mediation in Mozambique and Angola in UN police contingents in Bosnia, East Timor, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Darfur in the Sudan, and bilateral and multilateral training of defence forces from the SADC (Patel:1993). 

Zimbabwean foreign policy towards Britain centres on the land issue because the landlessness of the majority of black people in Zimbabwe was created during colonialism. Britain did not fulfil its promises towards Zimbabwe where land is involved.  However, Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth in December 2003 because it concluded that it was unfairly treated. Zimbabwe’s relations with Western powers were reasonably good up until the late 1990s. During that period Zimbabwe was able to access capital investment, trade and access to technology from the West. There was a coincidence between the degeneration into authoritarianism and estrangement with Western powers, especially Britain and the United States, and with some multilateral organisations (Rupiya: 2002).  The political violence during the 2000 and 2002 election campaigns, together with the land reform process, deepened criticism of the Zimbabwean government by Western powers.  The land reform process which the West strongly criticized from its inception is an integral feature of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy, and the reluctance of some countries to recognize its centrality to economic development and stability has continued to strain relations with some sections of the international community (Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2010). 

The relations between Zimbabwe and the European Union deteriorated sharply in 2002, resulting in mutual recrimination rather than concerted dialogue.  President Mugabe suggested that Africa is for Africans and the rest of the international community should respect that.  Sachikonye (2012) stated that this speech explains why Zimbabwean foreign policy towards Britain is purely confrontational and aggressive.  The failure of the dialogue resulted in the imposition of targeted sanctions against the leading members of the government.  The sanctions have been renewed annually since 2002.  Similarly, relations between Zimbabwe and the United States since 2000 have been poor.  Zimbabwe’s access to finance and credit facilities from United States and multilateral institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the African Development Bank were effectively blocked.  Zimbabwe’s relations with these agencies were immediately affected.

In response to sanction and criticism from the West, Zimbabwe adopted the “Look East Policy”.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been on the forefront to implement this policy guided by the Government’s Policy, Vision and Strategy documents designed to increase Zimbabwe’s cooperation with a number of countries in Asia and the Far East.  According to Sachikonye (2012), a deliberate decision was made to initially focus on China, Iran, Indonesia, India and Malaysia in effecting the above policy, hence broadening the scope of Zimbabwe’s foreign policy.  Zimbabwe and China have relations dating back to the country’s 1970s liberation struggle when Beijing provided arms and training to the black nationalist movement fighting the government of Smith. State-owned Zimbabwean businesses signed energy, mining and farming deals worth billions of dollars with Chinese companies.  The largest was with China Machine-Building International Corporation, for a $1,3 billion contract to mine coal and build thermal-power generators in Zimbabwe (The Africa Report:2007).  The Chinese government brought farm machinery, for example, tractors and trucks.  However, the Chinese are benefiting from Zimbabwe’s natural resources, for example, the Chiadzwa diamonds, gold, chrome and platinum.

In international relations, and therefore in the pursuit of a country’s Foreign Policy, there is an unwritten understanding that there are no permanent friends or enemies, but permanent interests.  Zimbabwe’s foreign policy therefore strives to foster long-standing relationships of mutual cooperation and trust.  For Zimbabwe’s foreign policy to succeed, it must aim to mobilize the understanding and support of all Zimbabweans.